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1More on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in the
UK: Evidence from the Application of Generalized Method of Moments Estimation
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance compliance and firm
performance in the UK. We develop a Governance Index and investigate its impact on
corporate performance after controlling for potential endogeneity through the use of a more
robust methodology Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Our evidence is based on a
sample of 435 non-financial publicly listed firms over the period 1999-2009. In contrast to
earlier findings in the UK literature, our results suggest that compliance with corporate
governance regulations is not a determinant of corporate performance in the UK. We argue
that results from prior studies showing a positive impact of corporate governance on firms’
performance may be biased as they fail to control for potential endogeneity. There may be a
possibility of reverse causality in the results of prior studies due to which changes in the
internal characteristics of firms may be responsible for the corporate governance compliance
and performance relationship. Our findings are based on GMM, which controls for the effects
of unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity and thus present more
robust conclusions as compared to the findings of previously published studies in this area.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Governance Index, Firm Performance, Endogeneity,
GMM
21. Introduction
The impact of corporate governance on corporate performance has been the main theme of
many research projects in accounting, finance and management literature. While considering
governance regulation, it is expected that protection of shareholders’ rights is given by firms’
compliance with corporate governance recommendations. Thus the theoretical aim of
complying with the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) provisions is to
reduce agency costs and improve corporate performance. This is consistent with agency
theory as described in Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1986). Managerial signalling
theory also indicates that complying with the code of corporate governance is a primary
signal to markets that the management follows better governance structure. This can lead to
an increased demand for shares by investors, which will increase share prices and the
shareholders’ wealth (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2002). It is thus expected that companies which adopt
recommendations of the Governance Code are likely to enhance their corporate performance.
However, if compliance with corporate governance is endogenously chosen by firms, then
each firm will reach the level of compliance in an optimal manner. In such a situation, no
relationship between equilibrium levels of governance and corporate performance should be
expected (Love, 2011). More specifically, better compliance with the corporate governance
practices might improve the redistribution of rents between shareholders and managers, but
not necessarily increase firms’ performance. Thus better compliance might reduce agency
costs for minority shareholders by disciplining managers and controlling shareholders more
effectively.
3In this regard, results of previous studies on the relationship between firms’ performance and
compliance with the corporate governance recommendations are inconclusive. For instance,
Conyon and Mallin (1997) and Peasnell, Pope and Young (1998) indicate improvements in
corporate performance after issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992 (which recommends the
adoption of some internal monitoring mechanisms with the aim of promoting shareholder
interests). By contrast, Weir and Laing (2000) and Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002) do not
find a significant relationship between complete compliance with corporate governance as
contained in the Cadbury Report and firms’ performance. They however, reported an increase
in the number of firms which follow good corporate governance practices after the Cadbury
Report. Similarly, Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003), Brown and Caylor (2006), Bozec, Dia &
Bozec (2008) and O’Connor (2012) indicate a positive association between governance and
firms’ performance. Moreover, other studies, such as, Core, Guay & Rusticus (2006), Gupta,
Kennedy & Weaver (2009) and Pandeya, Vithessonthia and Mansi (2015) report an
insignificant relationship between governance and firms’ performance.
The rationale for an association between corporate governance compliance and firms’
performance arises because better governance enhances efficiency in the monitoring of
managerial activities. This in turn, encourages managers to pursue value-maximizing projects
and to avoid expropriation of firms’ resources such as perquisites consumption (Love, 2011).
In addition, better governance increases investors’ protection by limiting expropriation of
firms’ resources from the majority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins,
2003). There is also evidence of a decrease in the likelihood of corporate insolvency as a
function of corporate governance characteristics because governance compliance improves
4the prospects for greater access to external funding (Claessens, Djankov & Klapper, 2003;
Fich and Slezak, 2008; Amana and Nguyen, 2013). In contrast, firms might comply to an
optimal level of corporate governance practices, which would not have a causal effect on
performance since corporate governance compliance could be endogenously determined. In
such a case there would be no observable relationship between governance and firms’
performance (Love, 2011).
Keeping all the above mentioned points in mind, this study specifically controls for the
effects of endogeneity and examines the impact of corporate governance compliance on
firms’ performance in the UK. We choose the UK for this investigation because it offers an
environment where corporate governance regulations are optional, unlike the US where
compliance is required by the US corporate law. Our findings contribute to the existing
literature in at least two different ways. First, we address aspects of endogeneity that have
been ignored or treated with arbitrary assumptions in previous research. While doing this we
apply a dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator.1 More specifically, we
control for endogeneity that arises from: (i) unobservable heterogeneity - firm fixed effects;
(ii) simultaneity - better corporate governance compliance leads to better performance, or
alternatively, better performance leads to better corporate governance compliance; and, (iii)
dynamic endogeneity - the possibility that contemporaneous compliance with the Governance
Code is a function of past performance.
Second, we develop a governance index with fifteen provisions based on the UK Combined
Code of Corporate Governance (2003), which is more comprehensive than prior UK studies
1 See Roodman (2009) for a description and details of dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator.
5(such as, Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Clacher, Doriye & Hillier, 2008;
Renders, Gaeremynck, Sercu, 2010; and, Mouselli, Abdulraouf & Jaafar, 2014). We also
include further aspects of compliance with respect to audit committees with different
measures, such as, the number of meetings held and participation of a financial expert in the
committees and believe that the use of all the additional measures would help in identifying
and explaining the governance compliance - performance relationship.
We find no significant evidence to suggest that current or past compliance with good
corporate governance practices leads to improvements in firms’ performance. We arrive at
similar conclusions whether we use accounting or market-based measures of firms’
performance (i.e., ROA and Tobin’s Q). We therefore report two major implications of our
results. First, our results show the importance of considering the possibility of an endogenous
relationship between governance and performance. Second, our results suggest that the causal
link found in previous research, in which good corporate governance practices enhance firm
performance, might be reversed in the sense that firms with low levels of performance might
improve corporate governance compliance to signal the market about future performance.
This effect is also more likely to arise as a result of the increase in institutional investments in
firms with high level of compliance. This would mean that improvement in corporate
governance compliance by firms is the result of greater monitoring by institutional investors
which select high performing firms in their portfolios. We therefore argue that our findings
have implications for the regulators and policy makers.
6The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the process of
constructing the corporate governance index used in this paper. Section 3 presents details of
model specification, data and the sample used in the study. Section 4 discusses the outcome
of our empirical analyses and findings of this study. Finally, section 5 concludes this study by
presenting a short summary of the overall findings, and outlines a brief description of the
main contributions. This section also highlights the limitations and specifies avenues for
future research.
2. Corporate Governance Index
In the UK only a limited number of published studies have considered the impact of corporate
governance indexes and corporate performance in their research (see for example, Padgett
and Shabbir, 2005; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Clacher, Doriye & Hillier, 2008; Renders,
Gaeremynck, Sercu, 2010; and, Mouselli, Abdulraouf & Jaafar, 2014). For example, Padgett
and Shabbir (2005) constructed a compliance index based on 12 corporate governance
provisions and investigate the relationship between the index and corporate performance.
Their findings suggest that more compliance with the combined code leads to higher stock
returns. Similarly, Arcot and Bruno (2007) built a corporate governance index based on eight
provisions of the corporate governance code and examine its relationship with corporate
performance measured by return on assets (ROA). They find that firms that become non-
compliant for good reasons outperform other firms that do comply with the corporate
governance code.
7In order to examine the effect of corporate governance compliance on two performance
measures, Tobin’s Q and ROA, Clacher et al. (2008) developed an index which is based on
the UK Combined Code (2003) recommendations. The findings indicate that compliance with
governance practices improves firm value; however, the effect varies between different
governance practices, in particular, quality of disclosure and audit are found to be the most
important practices that positively affect corporate value. They also find a positive
relationship between ownership structure and remuneration policies and corporate value,
however, board structure was found to have no significant effect on corporate value. In a
similar vein, Renders et al. (2010) examine the relationship between corporate governance
and firm value for all the firms included in FTSE Eurotop 300, including 373 firms from the
UK over the period 1999-2003. By employing the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS)
Regression Analysis as their research approach the findings of this study show a positive
relationship between corporate governance and firm value.
More recently, Mouselli et al. (2014) investigate the effect of corporate governance
provisions on accruals quality and stock returns and employs a corporate governance index
provided by the Risk Metrics Group. They not only assessed the overall firms’ governance
quality but also the quality of four sub-categories namely, board structure, audit practices,
compensation and ownership, and takeover defences. Their findings show the audit practice
as the most influential provision that positively affect the stock returns of UK firms. These
findings are in line with the results of Clacher et al. (2008) that also specify a relationship
between audit practice and firm value.
8There is also evidence covering the impact of governance indices on corporate performance
in the US. For example, Gompers et al. (2003) uses 24 corporate governance provisions for
constructing a governance index as a measure of shareholder rights across 1500 US firms.
Their findings suggest that firms’ performance vary according to shareholder rights.
Similarly, Cremers and Nair (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006), Bozec et al. (2008) and
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) use the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) for
investigating the interaction of corporate control and shareholder activism in the US. Their
results support the findings of Gompers et al. (2003), suggesting that companies with better
corporate governance have higher share returns and value.
In contrast to the above while examining the relationship between corporate governance and
performance, Core et al. (2006) employed the G-Index developed by Gompers et al. (2003)
and found insignificant relationship between the two variables. Similarly, Lehn, Patro &
Zhao (2007) used the E‐Index, developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009) and again show an
insignificant relationship between firms’ corporate governance compliance and performance.
Furthermore, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) re-examined the Gompers et al. (2003) results and
find no evidence of a significant effect of corporate governance practices on stock returns.
With a sample of S&P 500 firms and by employing the corporate governance indexes of
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Epps and Cereola (2008) find an insignificant
relationship between corporate governance rating and performance. Consistent with the
above, Johnson et al. (2008) and Gupta et al. (2009) also document insignificant relationships
between corporate governance compliance and firm performance.
9It is evident from the above discussions that only a few studies have used corporate
governance indexes in their investigations and the evidence is largely inconclusive (see for
example, Gompers et al. 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bozec et al., 2008; Core et al., 2006;
and, Gupta et al., 2009). In addition, most of the existing studies in the UK have only used a
few aspects of governance compliance in the construction of their corporate governance
indexes. As a consequence, we have constructed a governance index (GI) which addresses
several aspects of the corporate governance compliance regarding the structure of the board
of directors and its sub-committees. The index considers fifteen provisions of the UK
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003), as it more generally applies to the time
period of our study (1999-2009). Under the given guidelines, listed companies are required to
comply with the recommendations of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003)
or provide justifications in case of non-compliance.
We also apply a dummy coding scheme to evaluate the compliance of UK listed firms with
the combined code (see for example, Black et al., 2006a; Gompers, et al., 2003; Henry, 2008).
This method of rating gives a value of 1 if a company complies with a particular provision of
the Code and zero otherwise. The total score of the Governance Index thus comprises 15
points, which indicates higher compliance with the UK combined code. The factors to
construct the governance index (GI) are presented in Table 1 which also displays provisions
of the combined code that are used for constructing the corporate governance index. One
limitation of our GI is that it only considers the provisions of the Code that can be practically
measured and does not include those where information is not observable.
Insert Table 1 Here
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3. Research Strategy
Data and Sample
The data covers corporate governance and financial information of a sample of UK non-
financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the period 1999-2009. The
sample includes all those firms that have been part of the FTSE All-Share Index at any time
during the sample period. We include both listed and de-listed companies in the sample
which constitute a total of 1513 firms. We deleted all those firms for which the corporate
governance compliance and/or financial data was not available during the sample period. The
selection criteria resulted in a reduced sample size of 449 companies. In order to meet the
requirements of the method of analysis used in this research we needed at least four
consecutive years of data for each company which further reduced the sampled size to 435
firms. As a result, over the eleven years sample period, our final sample constituted 3875
firm-year observations.
We use BoardEx database as the main data source for extracting the number of executive and
independent non-executive directors and board sub-committees. In addition, data regarding
the number of meetings held by the audit committees and whether or not they have at least
one financial expert among their members was collected from annual reports of the sample
companies which were obtained in electronic form from the Northcote Website2. Financial
and accounting data was extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream database. Outliers are
2 http://www.northcote.co.uk offers electronic copies of UK companies’ annual reports.
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controlled in all financial variables by truncating the values to their 99th and 1st percentiles.
All values outside this range are set to the highest/lowest value within the specified range.
Model Specification
We initially begin our empirical analysis by considering the number of lags of corporate
performance which are adequate for capturing the dynamic completeness of our benchmark
model. In this regard, previous literature recommends the use of two lags for capturing the
influence of past performance on current data (see for example, Glen, Lee, & Singh, 2001;
Gschwandtner, 2005). However, we follow, Wintoki, Linck, & Netter (2012) which suggest
the use of four lags for controlling the endogeneity problem in estimating a regression model
of current corporate performance. The regression models include a number of control
variables with both accounting and market-based measures of corporate performance (ROA
and Tobin’s Q). We thus employ the following model:
CP    = α  +   β   CP            
     
+ β   Controls    + ε    (1)
where, CP    represents corporate performance measured by return on assets (ROA) or Tobin’s
Q (TQ), and controls represent control variables, which include; sales growth (SALESG),
capital expenditure (CAPITE), firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV), and R&D expenditures. In
addition, year and industry dummies are also included in the model as control variables.
1. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus equity plus market capitalisation divided by
total assets.
2. Return on assets is calculated as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets.
12
3. Sales growth is measured as the ratio of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales,
divided by previous year’s sales. In this regard, Durnev and Kim (2005) document that
companies with increased sales are more likely to grow faster than other companies.
Growing firms require greater external financing and are therefore more likely to adopt
better corporate governance practices for reducing the cost of capital (Beiner et al., 2006).
In line with the above arguments, previous studies have found a positive relationship
between corporate performance and firms’ growth (see for example, Gompers et al. 2003;
and Henry, 2008).
4. Capital expenditure is measured by the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets.
This is also consistent with prior studies, where investments and innovative potential of
companies are expected to have a positive impact on corporate performance (see for
example, Durnev and Kim, 2005, Black et al., 2006b; Dah, 2016).
5. Firm size (FSIZE) is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm size is likely
to have a positive impact on corporate governance mechanisms as a result of scale
differences in costs of compliance, operations, market regulations, and agency problems
(see for example, Jensen, 1986; Beiner et al., 2006).
6. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. On the one hand,
debt plays a crucial role in reducing the agency costs of free cash flows by preventing
investments in non-positive net present value (NPV) projects and can thus be considered
as a corporate governance mechanism. On the other hand, debt may increase the
likelihood of bankruptcy and credit risks, which may deprive a firm from investing in
profitable investment opportunities (Jensen, 1986).
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7. Research and development expenditure (R&D) is measured as the ratio of total research
and development expenditure to total assets. As R&D activities result in new
technologies, products or production processes, it is expected that it would help in
enhancing firms’ performance. In this regard, previous UK studies have reported a
positive and significant impact of R&D on corporate performance (Akbar and Stark,
2003; Poletti-Hughes, 2008; Shah, Liang and Akbar, 2013).
8. Differentials in industrial sectors are controlled with dummy variables. The industry
classification is based on the first digit of the Industry Classification Benchmark (FTSE,
2008) which includes eight non-financial sectors: Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials,
Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities and
Technology.
Next, in line with the arguments raised in previous research findings we consider the
possibility of an impact of past performance on current financial variables and on compliance
with corporate governance practices (see for example, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Guest,
2009; Wintoki, et al., 2012). In order to examine the presence of this relationship we estimate
the following model:
Current Variables     = α  + β   CP      +   β   
     
Controls      + ε    (2)
In this equation current variables and controls include GI, SALESG, CAPITE, FSIZE, LEV
and R&D whereas CP represents corporate performance measured by TQ or ROA. In
addition, year and industry dummies are included in the model.
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Furthermore, we test for strict exogeneity among the variables by employing the following
fixed-effects model:CP  ,   = α + β  GI  ,   + β   Controls  ,   +Ω  GI  ,       +Ω   Controls  ,       + μ   + ε    (3)
where GI  ,   represents the governance index and Controls  ,   represents control financial
variables as explained in equation (1) above. A fixed effects specification is used to control
for one type of endogeneity, in which time-invariant firm characteristics (fixed effects) may
be correlated with the explanatory variables. Therefore, if the future values of GI happen to
be significant in equation (3), it may suggest that the existent endogeneity of the explanatory
variables may not only be the result of fixed effects, but also because of a dynamic
relationship, i.e. future realizations of the explanatory variables are associated with current
performance. Therefore, equation (3) aims to highlight whether future values of GI and
control financial variables adjust in response to firm performance or by contrast are
exogenous (Guest, 2009; Wintoki, et al., 2012).
Application of System GMM
In addition to the above analyses, we perform our main analysis through the application of
System GMM as our preferred technique, and compare the results with estimators obtained
from regressions performed with OLS and fixed effects. We therefore specify a dynamic
model, where corporate performance (CP) is either ROA or TQ as follows:
CP    = α  + k   CP        + k   CP        + βGI    + γ   Controls    + μ   + ε    (4)
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where GI represents the governance index, Controls represent control variables as explained
above in equation (1).3
We consider the endogeneity tests from our model estimations and present the results with
two different specifications with system GMM [GMMa and GMMb]. First, we treat all
variables except the year dummies as endogenous. This allows the use of instruments from T2
for all the explanatory variables and T4 for the performance variables. Second, we consider
all those explanatory variables which are not strictly endogenous and are thus treating those
as predetermined. This allows us the use of an additional lag T1 of all such variables as an
instrument (i.e., for ROA: GI, LEV and R&D; and, for TQ: GI and R&D).
There is also the possibility that as corporate governance compliance does not present much
variation across time, its relationship with TQ could be dissolved as a firm fixed effect.
However, a problem with fixed effects estimations is that they do not account for time
varying omitted variables that could be present in the model and/or reverse causality. A way
to deal with reverse causality is the use of instrumental variables which in our regressions
should be correlated with the GI index, but do not have a direct relationship with
performance. It has also been argued in the existing literature that, often, the selection of
instruments is based on unrealistic assumptions of data, leading to the use of instruments that
are not totally exogenous (see for example, Durnev and Kim, 2005; and Aggarval et al. 2007,
among others).
3 The selection of lags to capture the dynamic nature of performance is based on the results reported in Table 4.
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In order to overcome the aforementioned problems, a dynamic panel data model is estimated
with System GMM as it allows for the use of past values of the GI index as instruments
without compromising the efficiency and consistency of the estimators. However, a problem
with instrumenting explanatory variables with lagged values could cause inconsistency if the
relationship of the lagged and current values is weak.
In order to obtain estimates of System GMM we apply xtabond2 in Stata (Roodman, 2009).
We specify the function for small-sample adjustment and report t-statistics and Wald chi-
square as opposed to Z-statistics and F-tests. The two-step command is also specified to
correct for finite-sample bias. We use robust standard errors which are consistent with panel-
specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the one-step estimation. We report the
validity of our System GMM regressions by testing for exogenous instruments with the
Hansen test of over-identification and the difference in Hansen test of Exogeneity.
We also take into account the effects of autocorrelation in this study by applying AR(2). This
is a method for testing second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. In
relation to the contributions of this study the results of this test has implications because the
presence of autocorrelation would specify that lag of the instruments and dependent variable
is endogenous. The outcome of AR (2) suggests the presence of no autocorrelation and
justifies the validity of our models. Also the instruments appear exogenous and valid as
suggested by the results of Hansen and difference in Hansen tests. In addition, the validity of
17
the system GMM models has also been identified as consistent in all the regressions of this
study.4
Finally, in order to analyse the possibility that current level of the governance index has an
impact on future corporate governance compliance, we follow Wintoki, et al., (2012) and
estimate whether past compliance with corporate governance determines current corporate
performance with the following model:
CP    = α  + k   CP        + βGI        + γControls        + μ     + ε    (5)
where CP represents corporate performance, GI represents the governance index, Controls
represents control variables as described earlier for equation (1).
4. Results and Discussion
Description Statistics
Table 2 shows the annual means and standard deviations of the GI index, performance
measures, and other explanatory variables. We can observe a constant annual increase of the
GI index, which may be the result of the review of the code of compliance over the last few
years of the sample period. Size, leverage and R&D expenditures show consistent mean
values over the sample period. TQ reaches a maximum of 3.14 in 1999 and a minimum of
1.31 in 2008. Furthermore, the maximum of ROA is 0.99 in 1999 whereas the minimum is
0.04 in 2002 and 2003. Table 3 shows the frequency of the governance index scores where
4 Column (4) of Table 8, is the only exception, where the results of Hansen test of over-identification is significant at the 10%
level.
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58% of the sample firms have compliance level between 81% and 100% whereas only 3.7%
of the sample firms have compliance level below 40%. These figures show that most of the
sample firms have complied with the governance code and suggest an impact of compliance
with the governance code on current performance.
Insert Table 2-3 Here
Table 4 presents results from the estimation of model (1). We find that the first, second and
fourth lags of ROA are statistically significant (column 1), whereas only the first and third
lags are significant for Tobin’s Q (column 2). In columns 3 and 4, we use older lags (year 3
and 4) which are significant for ROA, whereas for Tobin’s Q only the lag of year 3 is
significant. The impact of the estimated coefficients is lower than recent lags, which suggests
that although older lags explain current performance, such information is absorbed by more
recent lags.
Insert Table 4 Here
Table 5 shows findings from the estimation of the regression (model 2) using ROA in Panel
(A) and TQ in Panel (B). We find that the GI index is significantly determined by both past
performance measures which raise two important issues. First, it might be that there is reverse
causality in which performance would determine corporate governance and not vice versa.
Second, corporate governance and performance could be determined simultaneously as a
result of omitted variables bias. Most financial variables, with the exception of leverage, are
also significantly associated with past performance, Panel (B). Although Leverage is not
significantly associated with past TQ, it is significantly associated with past ROA, which
suggest a certain degree of dynamic endogeneity with firms’ performance. In addition, some
of the past values of the other financial variables significantly determine current values,
19
suggesting that not only GI is potentially endogenous with performance through a dynamic
relationship but also most of the control variables.
Insert Table 5 Here
Table 6 shows results from the estimation of model 3. It indicates that future values of GI are
not significantly associated with firm performance. This is consistent when future values of
financial variables are included in the model, as highlighted in columns (2) and (4).
Therefore, future compliance with corporate governance practices might not vary as a
response to past performance indicators which would allow the GI index to be considered as
predetermined, as opposed to endogenous, when applying a more robust technique of analysis
that controls for all aspects of endogeneity such as System GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991;
Roodman, 2009; Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016).
Insert Table 6 Here
Table 7 and 8 present the results for ROA and TQ as measures of performance, respectively.
Insert Table 7 and 8 Here
The first column of Tables 7 and 8 shows that the estimates for the GI index from a static
specification of the model has a positive and significant relationship between the governance
index and corporate performance. This finding is similar, in direction and magnitude to
previously published studies in this area (such as; Gompers, et al. 2003, and Padgett and
Shabbir, 2005, amongst others). Column (2) in Tables 7 and 8 presents an estimation with
fixed effects, in which the estimate for the GI index is positive and significant for ROA, but is
not significant for TQ, which suggest that fixed omitted variables, such as cross-listings or
20
managerial experience, might be driving the correlation between better governance and higher
TQ.
In both Tables 7 and 8, column (3) to (6) present results of the dynamic specification of our
models. The impact and significance of the GI index does not hold when System GMM is
applied in columns (5) and (6), neither is present in the dynamic OLS regression in column
(3), or the fixed effects estimation in column (4), which suggests that lagged performance
captures information of future corporate governance compliance. This finding highlights the
importance of specifying a dynamic model in the governance and compliance relationship.
After specifying a dynamic model and controlling for endogeneity, Table 7 and 8, show that
GI is not a significant determinant of corporate performance. This finding suggests a potential
bias that could arise when all aspects of endogeneity are not controlled, such as the dynamic
nature of the performance model, simultaneity and omitted variable bias (unobservable
heterogeneity). This finding combined with the results reported in Table 5 highlights the
possibility of reverse causality where changes in performance levels have a causal effect on
corporate governance compliance (but not vice versa). This finding suggests that firms
optimally select their level of corporate governance in response to firm characteristics, such
as performance (Chidambaran et al., 2008). This finding is also consistent with Shabbir
(2008), which suggests that UK firms are more compliant when lagged returns decrease and
less compliant when lagged operating performance increases.
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We find a significant and negative effect of leverage and R&D in the performance model in
Table 7. The negative effect of leverage is in line with Harris and Raviv (1988), suggesting
that larger debt might increase the accessibility of private benefits of control as the voting
power per unit of equity increases, which negatively impacts on performance. The estimated
coefficient of R&D expenditure is negative for ROA (Table 7) and positive for TQ (Table 8)
which is not surprising as the former measures performance from an accounting point of view
and the later measures future firm economic prospects. This finding is consistent throughout
the paper independently of the method of analysis. We find that firm size is negatively
associated with TQ in Table 8, the magnitude and sign of the coefficients of which are
consistent with those reported by other scholars (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Durnev and Kim,
2005).
A consistent and significant estimator from GMM regressions is expected to lie between the
OLS and the fixed effects estimator, or at least should not be significantly higher from the
former or significantly lower than the latter (Bond, 2009). In line with this, we have checked
the GMM regression estimators and based on the results reported in Table 7 and 8, it can be
confirmed that our significant GMM estimators comply with the above condition. This is
demonstrated by the overlapping 95% confidence intervals. Moreover, as can be observed in
Table 7, for LEV and R&D, this condition was met at the 1% level of significance. These
findings re-confirm the robustness of our results.
Table 9 shows the results for both corporate performance measures (ROA and TQ) calculated
by using pooled OLS and System GMM. The results indicate no relationship between the
22
lagged governance index and the contemporaneous performance measures. This finding
contradicts Vander Bauwhede (2009) who shows that greater lagged corporate governance
compliance regarding the structure and functions of the board is positively significant in
determining ROA (estimated with OLS). We find that after considering the likely
endogeneity of the variables, lagged R&D expenditure is positive and significant in
determining TQ, but insignificant for the ROA measure of performance. Likewise, past
leverage and past firms’ size are significant in determining current TQ.
Insert Table 9 Here
In summary, we find that compliance with corporate governance practices do not determine
current or future performance of firms. This finding is robust to potential endogeneity
problems that could bias the results. We also highlight the possibility of a reverse causality
between performance and corporate governance compliance, which posits that firms choose
their optimal level of corporate governance practices in response to internal firm
characteristics, such as performance. In light of all these points we argue that changes in
performance levels might have an effect on changes in corporate governance compliance by
UK firms.
These findings have implications as the absence of a link between corporate governance and
firms’ performance would naturally raise many questions. Theoretically, compliance with
corporate governance regulation is expected to help reduce the agency costs and thus
positively influence both current and future performance of firms. However, empirical
evidence in this paper does not show a relationship of this nature. This leads us to question
the recent calls for more stringent regulation and stricter control mechanisms in aftermath of
23
the recent 2007-2008 financial crisis. In line with this, our findings support the arguments of
Cloke (2013) who regards the occurring of various financial incidents, after the 2007
financial crisis as not just other episodes in the string of crises which is generally regarded as
a normal practice in capitalist economies but ‘...a transitional phase towards an entirely
different capitalist topology’ (p. 99). In light of this if compliance with the existing corporate
governance regulation is not useful in improving firms’ performance then alternative
solutions needs to be explored. Is the free market view of regulation adding value to the
debate here? This is a question which will need answers in future research paradigm.
5. Conclusion
In the existing literature the impact of corporate governance on firms’ performance has been
investigated by using performance as a function of the governance index. However, most of
the existing studies ignore the dynamic nature of the relationship between corporate
governance and performance (Guest, 2009; Wintoki, et al., 2012). This study, therefore,
examines the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance, using a
robust GMM specification that accounts for potential endogeneity problems that may have
influenced the results of existing studies. The findings in our study suggest that, after
controlling for all sources of possible endogeneity, there is no significant relationship
between the governance index and corporate performance. This finding is consistent in
contemporaneous and intertemporal specifications. By contrast, while using the OLS and
fixed-effects models as the methods of analysis we find that the level of compliance has a
significantly positive impact on ROA. This suggests that the results of previous studies that
do not take into account the dynamic nature of firms’ performance may be biased.
24
In other words, current corporate performance or other control variables in the empirical
models of published studies may affect the structure of corporate governance in the future.
We thus argue that investigating the relationship between corporate governance and
performance has to take into account the possibility of endogeneity arising from three
sources: unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and the dynamic corporate performance.
Theoretically, however, reporting insignificant relationship between the governance index
and corporate performance is unexpected, because complying with the corporate governance
best practice should essentially be considered as a good sign for perspective investors. The
insignificant relationship between the governance index and corporate performance may
indicate that firms that comply with the corporate governance recommendations do not
necessarily have higher profitability and higher market value than their counterparts that do
not comply. The insignificant relationship between the governance index and corporate
performance may be due to the possibility of reverse causality in which firms optimally
choose their level of corporate governance compliance depending on internal firm
characteristics, such as performance. We therefore argue that our findings have implications
for both the regulators and policy makers.
While our study adds to the existing literature on the governance-compliance and
performance relationship in different ways, we also acknowledge some potential limitations
of our study. Our GI index, for instance, only considers provisions of the Corporate
Governance Code (2003) that can be practically measured but does not include those
provisions where information is not observable and inclusion of further information about
those provisions would certainly add more insights. Also, although the issue of reverse
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causality is highlighted as a possible outcome, however, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
study all other determinants of corporate governance compliance which may have
implications on the findings of this research. Covering a detailed investigation of all these
aspects is therefore left to future research.
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Table 1
Construction of the Governance Index
Corporate Governance
Variables
Acronym Code Section(s)
/ Page No.
Explanations
1. Board of Directors
Chairman and CEO DUAL A.2.1(P.6) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the roles of chairman and
chief executive are not combined, 0 otherwise.
Board Structure NED A.3.2(P.7) A dummy variable equal to 1 if half or more of directors
are independent non-executive directors, 0 otherwise.
Chairman CHA A.2.2(P.6) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the board chairman is
independent non-executive director, 0 otherwise.
Senior independent
director
SEN A.3.3(P.8) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has an
independent non-executive senior, 0 otherwise.
2. Board Sub-Committees
Remuneration Committee
Presence RC A.1.2 &
B.2.1(P.6 &
P.15)
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a
remuneration committee, 0 otherwise.
Structure RCS B.2.1 (P.15) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the remuneration
committee has at least three independent non-executive
directors, 0 otherwise.
Chairman of
remuneration committee
CRC B.2.1 (P.65) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the
remuneration committee is independent, 0 otherwise.
Audit Committee
Presence AC C.3.1 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has an audit
committee, 0 otherwise.
Structure ACS C.3.1 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit committee has
at least three independent non-executive directors, 0
otherwise.
Financial expert ACF C.3.1 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit committee has
at least one financial expert, 0 otherwise.
Chairman CAC C.3.1 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the audit
committee is independent, 0 otherwise.
Meetings ACM C.3 (P.17) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit committee
holds at least three meetings a year, 0 otherwise.
Nomination Committee
Presence NC A.4.1 (P.67) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a
nomination committee, 0 otherwise.
Structure NCS A.4.1(P.67) A dummy variable equal to 1 if more than half of
members of the nomination committee are independent
non-executive directors, 0 otherwise.
Chairman CNC A.4.1(P.67) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the
nomination committee is independent, 0 otherwise.
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Table 2
Variables Means and Standard Deviations (Italics)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Firms in FTSE-
All
811 790 754 715 689 695 688 681 673 618 622
No. firms 318 330 345 369 383 408 418 425 425 426 424
% of the sample 39% 42% 46% 52% 56% 59% 61% 62% 63% 69% 68%
TQ 3.14 2.71 1.90 1.45 1.90 2.01 2.15 2.29 2.00 1.31 1.62
3.14 2.71 1.39 0.81 1.49 1.39 1.41 1.50 1.37 0.94 1.31
ROA 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05
0.16 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15
GI index 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88
0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15
SALEG 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.04
0.38 0.48 0.46 0.30 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.28
CAPITE 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
FSIZE 12.77 12.74 12.86 12.78 12.73 12.66 12.65 12.70 12.82 12.99 13.03
1.79 1.81 1.73 1.76 1.84 1.88 1.97 1.95 1.93 1.95 1.94
LEV 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22
0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
R&D 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
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Table 3
Frequency of the Governance Index Scores
Percentage Observations % of Sample
0-20% 39 1.0%
21-40% 104 2.7%
41-60% 447 11.5%
61-80% 1021 26.4%
81-100% 2262 58.4%
3873 100%
Table 4
Lags on Corporate Performance
In this table, we report results from the OLS estimation of equation 1. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-
clustered standard errors. Year and industry dummies are included in all regressions. P-values are reported in
parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable ROA TQ ROA TQ
Performance (-1) 0.632*** 0.632***
(0.000) (0.000)
Performance (-2) 0.098** -0.019
(0.016) (0.774)
Performance (-3) 0.015 0.133*** 0.369*** 0.342***
(0.790) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)
Performance (-4) 0.061* -0.020 0.146*** -0.009
(0.088) (0.444) (0.000) (0.672)
SALESG 0.048*** -0.231** 0.056*** 0.056
(0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.540)
CAPITE 0.003 0.412 0.120* 0.770
(0.950) (0.226) (0.051) (0.233)
FSIZE 0.002 -0.018 0.005** -0.031
(0.145) (0.102) (0.032) (0.162)
LEV -0.018 0.042 -0.044** 0.098
(0.125) (0.762) (0.030) (0.732)
R&D -0.206*** 2.94*** -0.502*** 4.46***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.7255 0.6224 0.5252 0.3559
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Table 5
Relationship between the Corporate Governance Index, Control Variables, and Past ROA
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of current governance index (GI) and current control variables,
on past performance and historic values of control variables (equation 2). Performance is measured by return on
assets (ROA) in Panel (A) and Tobin’s Q (TQ) in panel (B). The control variables include sales growth
(SALEG), capital expenditure (CAPITE), firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV) and R&D expenditure (R&D). All
p-values are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. Year and industry dummies are included in all
regressions. P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Panel (A)
Dependent Variable GI SALESG CAPITE FSIZE LEV R&D
ROA(t-1) 0.084* -0.274*** 0.048*** 2.86*** -0.107* -0.155***
(0.064) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000)
SALESG(t-1) -0.028*** 0.007** -0.203** -0.003 0.007**
(0.003) (0.013) (0.027) (0.698) (0.044)
CAPITE(t-1) 0.030 0.217 -2.77*** 0.455*** -0.008
(0.781) (0.260) (0.010) (0.001) (0.752)
FSIZE(t-1) 0.034*** -0.023*** -0.002** 0.032*** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.012)
LEV(t-1) 0.029 -0.060 0.020 3.05*** -0.022**
(0.372) (0.191) (0.127) (0.000) (0.042)
R&D(t-1) 0.218 0.060 -0.027 -3.70*** -0.246*
(0.174) (0.773) (0.362) (0.004) (0.060)
R2 0.2684 0.0736 0.1316 0.2764 0.2026 0.4090
Panel (B)
TQ(t-1) 0.006** 0.037*** 0.002* -0.095*** 0.001 0.008***
(0.032) (0.000) (0.070) (0.008) (0.798) (0.000)
SALESG(t -1) -0.028*** 0.006** -0.182* -0.003 0.010**
(0.002) (0.036) (0.071) (0.767) (0.017)
CAPITE(t -1) 0.045 0.100 -1.97* 0.432*** -0.066**
(0.681) (0.602) (0.062) (0.001) (0.028)
FSIZE(t -1) 0.037*** -0.021*** -0.001 0.031*** -0.004**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.154) (0.000) (0.012)
LEV(t -1) 0.022 -0.088* 0.019 3.04*** -0.022**
(0.515) (0.052) (0.171) (0.000) (0.036)
R&D(t -1) 0.073 0.116 -0.087*** -5.05*** -0.227*
(0.616) (0.664) (0.001) (0.000) (0.055)
R2 0.2675 0.0912 0.1242 0.2530 0.1571 0.3740
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Table 6
Test of Strict Exogeneity
This table reports results from the fixed-effects estimation of the model in equation 3. All p-values are based on
robust standard errors. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable: ROA in columns (1)
and (2); Tobin’s Q in columns (3) and (4). P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable ROA ROA TQ TQ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GI 0.027* 0.022 -0.230 -0.317
(0.093) (0.171) (0.593) 0.427)
SALESG 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.374*** 0.262***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
CAPITE 0.172*** 0.084 2.33** 0.705
(0.003) (0.132) (0.017) (0.411)
FSIZE -0.006 -0.043*** -0.762*** -1.57***
(0.361) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEV -0.065** -0.064** 0.516 1.43***
(0.040) (0.027) (0.270) (0.002)
R&D -0.657*** -0.760*** 0.498 1.147
(0.000) (0.000) (0.886) (0.699)
GI(t+1) 0.022 0.020 0.596 0.471
(0.247) (0.267) (0.126) (0.188)
SALESG(t+1) -0.019*** 0.289***
(0.002) (0.002)
CAPITE(t+1) 0.254*** 4.80***
(0.000) (0.000)
FSIZE(t+1) 0.049*** 1.217***
(0.000) (0.000)
LEV(t+1) 0.033 -1.037**
(0.210) (0.025)
R&D(t+1) 0.258 -2.35
(0.154) (0.389)
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Table 7
The Effect of the Governance Index on Current ROA
This table represents the results of static and dynamic models using return on assets (ROA) as a measure of
corporate performance. Industry dummies are included in the OLS regressions, whereas, year dummies are
included in all the regressions. Firm clustered standard errors are used in the fixed effects estimation. All t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-identification is under the null
that all instruments are valid. Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the
equations in levels are exogenous. P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Confidence intervals at the 95% are presented in brackets whereas a
represent confidence intervals at the 99%.
Dependent Variable
(ROA)
Static Model Dynamic Model
OLS FixedEffects OLS
Fixed Effects GMMa GMMb
GI 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.030
(0.000) (0.007) (0.166) (0.139) (0.566) (0.183)
SALESG -0.001 0.026*** 0.033***[0.020,0.047]
0.033***
[0.017, 0.048]
0.019*
[-0.001, 0.040]
0.012
(0.852) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.288)
CAPITE 0.237*** 0.171*** -0.028 -0.040 -0.114 -0.155
(0.000) (0.002) (0.381) (0.278) (0.219) (0.162)
FSIZE 0.011*** -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.0001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.540) (0.110) (0.186) (0.974) (0.746)
LEV -0.052*** -0.045 -0.019**[-0.041, 0.004]a
-0.022**
[-0.048, 0.003] a
-0.039 -0.128***
[-0.207, -0.048] a
(0.001) (0.150) (0.035) (0.025) (0.172) (0.000)
R&D -0.915*** -0.589*** -0.234***[-0.375, -0.093] a
-0.247***
[-0.400, -0.094] a
-0.576***
[-0.879, -0.274]a
-0.725***
[-1.054, -0.396] a
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA(t-1) 0.685***[0.611, 0.759]
0.672***
[0.603, 0.741]
0.527***
[0.429, 0.625]
0.511***
[0.411, 0.612]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA(t-2)
0.116***
[0.054, 0.178]
0.113***
[0.059, 0.167]
0.136***
[0.064, 0.207]
0.152***
[0.078, 0.225]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.2765 0.1855 0.7311 0.7304
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.317 0.208
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 0.236 0.280
Diff-in-Hansen test of Exogeneity (p-value) 0.688 0.561
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Table 8
The Effect of Governance Index on Current Tobin’s Q
This table represents results of static and dynamic models using Tobin’s Q (TQ) as a measure of corporate
performance. Industry dummies are included in the OLS regressions, whereas, year dummies are included in all
the regressions. All t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. Firm clustered standard errors are used in the
fixed effects estimation. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals,
under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are
valid. Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are
exogenous. P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. Confidence intervals at the 95% are presented in brackets.
Dependent
Variable (TQ)
Static Model Dynamic Model
OLS Fixed
Effects
OLS Fixed Effects GMMa GMMb
GI 0.349** 0.105 0.161 0.300 0.217 0.261
(0.036) (0.718) (0.182) (0.169) (0.636) (0.366)
SALESG 0.310*** 0.183** 0.216*** -0.056 0.102 -0.029
(0.001) (0.017) (0.002) (0.555) (0.573) (0.852)
CAPITE 0.870** 4.637*** 0.144 0.371 0.022 -0.164
(0.071) (0.000) (0.628) (0.470) (0.985) (0.886)
FSIZE -0.124*** -0.426*** -0.030***[-0.053, -0.008]
-0.360***
[-0.526, -0.194]
-0.109*
[-0.222, 0.003]
-0.109**
[-0.211, -0.007]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.057) (0.037)
LEV 0.251 0.767** 0.082 0.023 -0.373 -0.286
(0.182) (0.044) (0.486) (0.940) (0.370) (0.429)
R&D 8.49*** 2.904 2.76***[1.378, 4.141]
4.75**
[0.891, 8.609]
3.58***
[1.348, 5.809]
3.17***
[1.267, 5.083]
(0.000) (0.312) (0.000) (0.016) (0.002) (0.001)
TQ(t-1) 0.608***[0.523, 0.694]
0.325***
[0.254, 0.397]
0.376***
[0.256, 0.496]
0.374***
[0.254, 0.495]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TQ(t-2) -0.014 -0.061** -0.042 -0.040
(0.642) (0.026) (0.214) (0.230)
R2 0.2451 0.1227 0.5694 0.2942
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.130 0.130
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 0.075 0.117
Diff-in-Hansen tests of Exogeneity (p-value) 0.955 0.994
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Table 9
The Impact of Lagged Governance Index on Current Performance
All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. Industry dummies are included in the OLS
regressions, whereas, year dummies are included in all the regressions. AR(2) is a test for second-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-
identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null
that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. ***;**;* represent significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
Performance (ROA) Performance (TQ)
Pooled
OLS
System
GMMa
Pooled
OLS
System
GMMb
GI(t-1) -0.004 -0.012 0.098 0.465
(0.690) (0.641) (0.449) (0.171)
SALESG(t-1) -0.011** -0.013 0.060 0.166
(0.040) (0.125) (0.276) (0.240)
CAPITE(t-1) -0.035 -0.067 -0.251 -0.474
(0.142) (0.467) (0.479) (0.685)
FSIZE(t-1) -0.000 -0.003 -0.012 -0.104*
(0.964) (0.378) (0.357) (0.057)
LEV(t-1) 0.023*** 0.022 0.051 -1.07***
(0.003) (0.301) (0.711) (0.008)
R&D(t-1) 0.005 -0.104 2.38*** 3.55***
(0.925) (0.510) (0.007) (0.007)
Performance(t-1) 0.748*** 0.649*** 0.597*** 0.332***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Performance(t-2) 0.108*** 0.154*** -0.003 -0.054
(0.001) (0.004) (0.921) (0.206)
R2 0.7296 0.5607
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.517 0.256
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 0.284 0.176
Diff-in-Hansen test of Exogeneity (p-value) 0.164 0.877
